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Beranek: Civil Rights: Privacy as a Federal Civil Right

CASE COMMENTS
CIVIL RIGHTS: PRIVACY AS A FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHT
York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 84 Sup.
Ct. 794 (1964)
Plaintiff brought a civil action in a federal district court against
three municipal police officers alleging a violation of section 1979 of
the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1871.1 She asserted that she had been
deprived of her civil rights under color of municipal authority and
sought damages for the alleged taking and distribution of nude and
indecent photographs of her person. The photographs were taken
by defendants at the police station where plaintiff had voluntarily
come to report an assault upon herself. Defendants asserted at the
time that the photographs were necessary for police investigation.
There was in fact no such necessity. Defendants photographed
plaintiff over her objections and subsequently distributed copies to
other police officers. The district court dismissed for want of jurisdiction on grounds that the plaintiff had not shown the deprivation of
a federally protected civil right as required by section 1979.2 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit HELD,
that the defendants' acts, which constituted an arbitrary intrusion
upon the security of plaintiff's privacy, amounted to a deprivation of
liberty without due process of law as guaranteed by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Judgment reversed, District
3
Judge McBridge dissenting.
The decision raises the general issue of the extent to which the
fourteenth amendment authorizes the federal government to protect
individuals from the actions of state or municipal authorities. The
case brings into sharp relief the controversy concerning those rights
that will be included under the protective umbrella of section 1979.
Section 1979 provides a civil remedy for a person deprived of any
civil right that is protected by either the United States Constitution
or federal laws, when such deprivation occurs "under color" of state
1. REv. STAT. §1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1958) provides in part: "Every
person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of
any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen . . . to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....... The above was originally
enacted as §1 of The Civil Rights Act of 1871.
2. Downie v. Powers, 193 F.2d 760 (10th Cir. 1951).
3. York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 456 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 84 Sup. Ct.
794 (1964).
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authority. Originally enacted as part of the Congressional Civil Rights
program of 1865 to 1875, 4 at a time when Congress was motivated by
strong nationalistic trends resulting from militant abolitionism,5 section 1979 has since been subjected to a varied pattern of judicial interpretation. Earliest judicial construction severely limited the scope
and effect of the civil rights legislation.6 Initially a distinction was
drawn as to rights adhering to national citizenship and those adhering to state citizenship.7 In the former case, protection was severely
restricted s with the result that the entire legislative program was not
applied to a wide category of individual rights. 9
The Civil Rights-Cases'0 of 1883 established a high point in judicial restriction of both the Congressional program and the fourteenth amendment. In these cases, the public accommodation portions
of the 1875 Civil Rights Act" were invalidated on the ground that
they were directed at individual action and that the fourteenth amendment, which was the basis of the act, was applicable only to state
action.
Today, of the four original civil rights acts'12 section 1979 is the
best preserved survivor; however its unsettled and stormy history
provides no clear indication of future interpretation. 3 Past judicial
construction of the statute's elements has primarily concerned two
areas: (1) definition of "under color" of law and (2) interpretation of
the nature and extent of the rights protected by the statute.
4. Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L.
REv. 1323 (1952).
5. See Screws v. United States, 352 U.S. 91, 140 (1945) (dissenting opinion);
Note, 36 IND. L.J. 317, 318 (1961).
6. See, e.g., Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906); Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3 (1883); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883); United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36
(1873); CARR, FEDERAL PROT-MON OF CivIm RIGHTs 40-46 (1947).
7. Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883).
8. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
9. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554, 555 (1875); SlaughterHouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74, 79 (1873); Comment, 26 IND. L.J. 361, 362
(1951).
10. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
11. Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114, §§1, 2, 18 Stat. 335.
12. Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335; Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22,
17 Stat. 13; Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140; Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31,
14 Stat. 27. Section 1 of 17 Stat. 13 (1871) is today REv. STAT. §1979 (1875), 42
U.S.C. §1983 (1958). For present statutes based on the above Congressional Acts see
42 U.S.C. §§1981-94 and 18 U.S.C. §§242, 3231.
13. See DeLoach v. Rogers, 268 F.2d 928, 930 (5th Cir. 1959); Note, 66 HARV.
L. REv. 1285 (1953).
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In York there was no contention that defendants were not acting
"under color" of state authority, 14 rather the issue faced was whether
the rights of the plaintiff had been violated and, if so, whether these
rights were within the purview of the statute. The court stated that
the defendants' actions might have constituted an unreasonable search,
but because of the additional fact of the distribution of the photographs, it felt constrained to consider whether the total acts of defendants resulted in a violation of the fourteenth amendment. Thus,
disregarding the aspect of search and seizure entirely, the court held
that plaintiff's liberty, that is, her right of privacy, had been taken
without due process.
The York case is not entirely consistent with prior section 1979
decisions establishing the scope of individual liberties and the extent
to which they are protected by due process. The overwhelming number of such decisions have arisen in situations involving police abuse
of persons under investigation or arrest,15 unreasonable searches and
seizures, 1b and unlawful imprisonment. 1" Recent decisions indicate
a trend toward a liberal interpretation of section 1979. For example,
in Cohen v. Norris,- decided in 1962, the court specifically disapproved three prior decisions 9 in holding that the existence of a specific purpose or intent on the part of defendant to discriminate or
to deprive plaintiff of a civil right was unnecessary to sustain the cause
of action.
In Monroe v. Pape,'20 decided in 1961, the Supreme Court in a
comprehensive opinion sought to review the law surrounding application of section 1979. The case involved an unreasonable search and
arrest by police. The Court was primarily concerned with the question whether the officers acted "under color" of law, and little attention was devoted to an analysis of particular rights protected by
the act. Thus the Court's decision provided no guidance to a solution
of the issues involved in York.
York is actually a two-sided deviation from the existing body of
the law evidenced by the decisions in Monroe and Cohen. First,
past civil rights cases dealing generally with the right of privacy do
14. 324 F.2d at 454 n.6.
15. Antelope v. George, 211 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Idaho 1962).
16. Cohen v. Norris, 300 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1962).
17. Antelope v. George, supra note 15; see also York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450
(9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 84 Sup. Ct. 794 (1964).
18. 300 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1962).
19. Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1959); Agnew v. City of Compton,
239 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1956); Walker v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n,
268 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1959). The Hoffman and Agnew cases were expressly overruled by Cohen, while the Walker case was specifically disapproved in part.
20. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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so only as it is related to unreasonable searches and seizures or to
similar police or official actions. The York case takes the right of
privacy out of this context and for the first time deals with it on an
independent basis. The York court cites Wolf v. Colorado21 as holding that privacy is within the meaning of liberty as protected by due
process. Although this point is well recognized,22 York is to date the
strongest extension of federal protection in this area, because it tends
to establish privacy as an independent right, the violation of which
gives rise to a claim under section 1979. York does not create an
absolutely new right, but it does allow federal courts to grant relief
on the basis of privacy alone and thereby avoid hinging their
reasoning on such concepts as unreasonable searches and seizures or
similar police abuse of prisoners or suspects.
York also deviates from past decisions by enlarging the circumstances under which the right of privacy can be violated. As admitted in the York opinion,23 past violations of due process have
occurred only in cases in which plaintiff was to some degree the occupant of a "preferred position,"24 that is, a position in which his constitutional rights were highly susceptible to violation. Such a situation would necessarily include either arrest, search, or investigation
in which plaintiff, himself, was subjected to an element of jeopardy.
Plaintiff in York was merely a voluntary visitor to the police station,
and it cannot be said that her civil rights were particularly vulnerable to violation. Nor was she subjected to accusation and accompanying jeopardy. Thus, the court, in dispensing with the aspect of
"preferred position" by finding it completely immaterial to the cause
of action, departed from precedent.
In considering the future effects of York it should be noted that
the decision is easily distinguishable on the basis of its unique set
of facts. The case, however, should serve to inform a plaintiff, who
has suffered an injury through the actions of a state or municipal
official, that he not only has a cause of action in tort but also a possible remedy through section 1979. As the section 1979 remedy may
be sought without first exhausting state procedures, 25 it seems that
plaintiffs, desirous of avoiding a strict application of common law

21. 38 U.S. 25 (1949).
22. See, e.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 867 U.S.
643 (1961); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
23. 824 F.2d at 456.
24. 824 F.2d at 457 (dissenting opinion).
25. McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963); Moss v. Jones, 288 F.2d
842 (6th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 868 (1961), rehearing denied, 368 U.S.
922 (1961). It should be noted that state administrative procedures must be exhausted prior to invoking §1979.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol17/iss1/6

4

